On January 26, 2026, the Supreme Court granted the petition in Salazar v. Paramount Global (Case No. 25-459) to address “[w]hether the phrase ‘goods or services from a video tape service provider,’ as used in the [Video Privacy Protection Act]’s definition of ‘consumer,’ refers to all of a video tape service provider’s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services.” The petition follows a decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal which held that the VPPA did not apply because Salazar was subscribed to an “online newsletter” and not “audiovisual materials” as required under the VPPA. 

This decision highlights a circuit split: the D.C. and Sixth Circuits have held that a consumer under the VPPA must be subscribed specifically to audiovisual materials of a “video tape service provider”; by contrast, the Second and Seventh Circuits have held that a “consumer” need only be subscribed to any good or service provided by a video tape service provider. The Supreme Court's decision to grant the petition should resolve this split and provide clarity to who qualifies as a consumer under the VPPA.

In recent years, the VPPA has been used as the basis of a number of purported class action lawsuits, which generally alleged that the use of companies' tracking cookies (including the Facebook Pixel) was a violation of the VPPA's prohibition on disclosing the “audiovisual” materials which a user accesses.

On the substantive merits of the case, the petition argues that the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the phrase “goods or services from a video tape service provider” was incorrect. To argue this, the petition points to the language of the VPPA, which the petitioner alleges uses the term “goods” and “services” according to their common, everyday meaning. By contrast, according to the petition, the Sixth Circuit imposed an additional limitation: only audiovisual goods or services qualifies for VPPA protection. 

As an additional point to support this, the petition also points out two differences within the language of two sections. Section 2710(a)(1) refers to “goods or services from a video tape service provider” while Section 2710(a)(3) refers to “video materials or services from a video tape service provider.” Accordingly, the petition points to this difference to show Congress's purported intent to mean different things--and the Sixth Circuit (per the Petitioner) did not meaningfully address this meaning in its decision. 

The petition also points to several additional instances in which the Sixth Circuit allegedly failed to properly interpret (or give Congress's intended meaning) to various VPPA terms, all of which together suggest that the Sixth Circuit's decision should be overturned at the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court's decision in this case could have significant implications for VPPA claims. If the Supreme Court upholds the Sixth Circuit's interpretation, it may confirm a more narrow definition of “consumer," limiting who may bring VPPA claims in the first place. By contrast, if the Supreme Court overturns the Sixth Circuit's definition, it may allow for the continued assertion of broad VPPA claims.